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The Short—Run Demand for Money:
A Reconsideration
ABSTRACT
The partial—adjustment approach to the specification of the short—
run demand for money has dominated the literature for more than a
decade. There are three basic problems with this approach. First, the
same lag structure is imposed on all variables, and each independent
variable enters only as a current value. In contrast a rational
individual would respond to different variables (income, interest rates,
prices) with quite different lags. Second, when the general price level
is subject to gradual adjustment hut can move quickly in response to
supply shocks, the influence of these supply shocks should enter with a
negative sign. Third, the estimated equation for real balances may not
be a money demand equation at all, but rather its coefficients may
represent a shifting mixture of demand and supply responses.
The empirical work examines several alternative dynamic specifica-
tions, including a generalized partial adjustment framework and the
error—correction model. Both of the latter specifications exhibit
greater structural stability after 1973 than the standard partial
adjustment specification, and the generalized partial adjustment model
also yields relatively small errors in post—sample dynamic simulations.
Shifts in coefficients as the sample period is extended after 1973 are
consistent with the interpretation that the real balance equation no
longer traces out structural demand parameters, hut rather a mixture of
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References 50I. INTRODUCTION
Slightly more than a decade ago, the demand for money was one of
the least controversial topics in macroeconomics, both in its underlying
theory and in the stability and plausibility of empirical coefficient
estimates. Conference sessions on the demand for money were an oasis of
tranquility when compared to the controversial state of Phillips curves
and aggregate supply macroeconomics in general. While the theory of the
long—run demand for money remains essentially intact, a cloud of
uncertainty now hangs over the entire subject of the short—run demand
for money. This general air of discomfort originates partly in the
much—researched "Goldfeld puzzle" (1976) of too little money and too
much velocity in the mid—1970s and has been reinforced by the more
recent puzzle of too much money and too little velocity in 1981—83.
But there are deeper issues at stake as well. The empirical
relationships estimated under the heading of "short—run money demand"
even on pre—1973 data yielded a large coefficient on the lagged depen-
dent variable and were plagued by substantial residual autocorrelation.
While "inertia" in the adjustment of real money balances was usually
explained as resulting from portfolio adjustment costs, LaidiLer (1982)
and Gordon (1984a) have suggested that the short—run money demand
function may be partly a Phillips curve in disguise. Sluggish adjust-
ment of real balances may reflect inertia in aggregate price adjustment
as well as inertia in portfolio adjustment, and some of the post—1973
instability in the short—run money demand function may he a side effect
of shifts in the Phillips curve that occurred as a result of supply
shocks in 1973—75.
The recognition of inertia in the inflation process leads to other2
reasons for doubt that a short—run structural demand for money function
can be identified (Cooley—Leroy, 1981; Coats, 1982). The usual function
explains real balances as depending on current output and interest rates
and lagged real balances. If prices are sticky, then the burden of
achieving short—run adjustment to changing output and interest rates
must be carried by the nominal money supply. If the central bank in an
attempt to stabilize interest rates allows the money supply to respond
instantly and fully to changes in output and interest rates, then these
passive shifts in the money supply function will trace Out the desired
short—run money demand function. But if the central bank abandons
interest rate stabilization and instead targets the growth rate of the
nominal money supply, then roles are reversed and output and interest
rates become endogenous variables responding to money. Although the
Federal Reserve neither completely stabilized short—term interest rates
nor monetary growth for any substantial interval during the post—Accord
period, nevertheless there is widespread agreement that over time the
Fed shifted its emphasis from interest rate stabilization to monetary
aggregate targeting. If this shift did take place, then coefficients in
conventional equations in journal articles on the "demand for money" may
actually represent a shifting mixture of demand and supply responses.
This paper attempts to provide a new interpretation of the short—
run demand for money that emphasizes the multiple relations among the
four major variables that enter the standard money demand function——the
nominal money supply, real output, the price level, and the interest
rate. Even the most recent investigations and literature surveys on the
"Coldfeld money demand puzzle" give little attention to the other
functional relations that involve the four variables. These include the3
short—run Phillips curve that explains price changes as depending on the
level and change in output and (at least implicitly) past changes in
money; the short—run money supply function that relates the money supply
to the monetary base, interest rates, reserve requirements, and the
discount rate; the money reaction function that relates the monetary
base to one or more determinants of money demand, including output,
prices, and interest rates; and the closely related equations describing
the evolution of the rate of change of money as depending on past
monetary changes and unemployment, used for the purpose of proxying the
concept of "anticipated monetary change" in the work of Barro (1977),
Barro—Rush (1980) and their followers. The existence of these "other"
relationships linking money, output, the price level, and the interest
rate suggests that the short—run money demand functions estimated
heretofore may be better viewed as "interesting reduced forms rather
than as structural equations that provide estimates of coefficients
corresponding to structural parameters derived from the theory of
portfolio behavior. Shifts in coefficients in these reduced forms rry
not reflect changes in portfolio behavior but rather (a) movements of
variables in the "other' equations that are incorrectly omitted from the
equation explaining real balances (e.g., supply shocks and price con—
trols in the Phillips curve equation), (b) instability in the coeffi-
cients in the "other" equations, or (c) a shift in control regimes by
the central bank.
In addition to its discussion of specification issues in this
multi—equation context, the paper provides new econometric estimates of
equations explaining nominal or real money balances. The primary
emphasis in the empirical section is on loosening the constraints on4
dynamic adjustment behavior that have been almost universally imposed
in the short—run money demand literature. In particular, equations with
otherwise identical sets of explanatory variables are estimated for
several different classes of dynamic adlustment models, including the
conventional "Koyck log level" approach, first—difference changes, and
the "error—correction" model advocated by David Hendry (1980a, 1980b),
James Davidson (1984a, 1984b), and their collaborators. Differences in
results with the alternative dynamic models are discussed within the
multi—equation context, and each model is subjected to dynamic post—
sample simulations over the decade since 1973 and the four years after
the shift in monetary control regimes in late 1979.
In light of the large literature on the conventional approach,
including the recent surveys by Laidler (1977, 1980) and by Judd and
Scadding (1982), no attempt is made here to review systematically the
papers that address the issues under discussion. Instead, the emphasis
in the theoretical section is on establishing links between the short—
run demand for money function and related topics in time series
macroeconometrics, and in the empirical section is on interpreting
coefficients estimated for alternative models of the adjustment process
in light of the foregoing theoretical analysis.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE SHORT—RUN AND LONG—RUN FUNCTIONS
The Standard Approach
The long—run and short—run concepts of the demand for money are
distinguished by the absence of adjustment costs in the former and their
presence in the latter. Allowing upper—case letters to stand for log5
levels (and reserving lower—case letters subsequently for growth rates),
the long—run demand for real balances in logs (M —Pt)depends on a




The long—run demand for money function assumes that tastes are constant
and that individuals can adjust their holdings of money instantly and
costlessly to any change in the. vector of the variables (X) that
determine money holdings. A universal feature of every theory of the
long—run demand for money is homogeneity of degree one with respect to
the price level. The demand for money is a demand for real balances,
and in fact this distinction between real and nominal balances is
sometimes invoked to support the feasibility of identifying a demand for
money function that is separate from a money supply or money reaction
function.
Because of adjustment costs, actual real money balances (M—P) are
not always equal to the desired amount (M—P). Only a portion (n) of
the gap between desired and actual real balances is closed in a single
discrete time period (denoted by the subscript "t"), implying that the
current level of real balances is a weighted average of the desired




0 < q 1.
When (1) and (2) are combined, the demand for real balances can be
written:6
(3) Mt —= flf(X)+(l—n)(Mi_Pi).
When the vector "X" is made to include real output, a short—term market
interest rate, and the interest rate on savings deposits, (3) is exactly
the specification used in Goldfeld's original paper (1973) and that
yields a post—1972 prediction puzzle.
The long—run function (1) asks how much money individuals would
hold in hypothetical alternative circumstances in which the elements of
the "X" vector take on different values. The short—run function
attributes the sluggish adjustment of the observed values of real
balances in response to the more volatile "K" changes to postulated
portfolio adjustment costs, with unity minus the estimated coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable (1—(1—n)) =ninterpreted as the
portfolio adustrnent coefficient, and (1—n)/n as the average adjustment
lag. The formulation (3) is not the only possible representation of
adjustment costs. Below we examine the implications of several
variations, including adjustment costs for nominal rather than real
balances (as suggested by Goldfeld, 1976), and separate adjustment
processes for nominal balances and prices.
TheShort—run Demand for ionev:Who Needs It?
Theconcept of the long—run demand for money plays such a central
rolein macroeconomic theory that it isdifficult to imagine living
without it. Numerous theoretical exercises in monetary theory,
including the study of optimal inflation and other long—run issues, are
based on the standard twin assumptions that the supply of money is
exogenous and that the demand for money is stable. Often in such models
the price level does the necessary quick maneuvering to equate the7
demand for nominal balances to the exogenous supply. Similarly, stable
long—run money demand functions, both at home and abroad, are key
ingredients in the monetary theory of the balance of payments and the
more recent monetary theory of exchange rate determination. In
macroeconomic theory for the closed economy, it has become common to
specify aggregate real demand (Q) as an inverted money demand function,
e.g., Q =c(M—P)+v,with interest rates omitted and v treated as white
noise.
What seems less clear is the need for a short—run money demand
function. This startling assertion may seem even more preposterous to
the large number of economists who have struggled to find a stable
empirical function. But there are good reasons to doubt the need for
this concept, from both a monetarist and a Keynesian perspective.
Monetarists, while providing the intellectual underpinnings for
central bank monetary targets, usually show disdain for and disinterest
in short—run relationships, reflecting their long time horizon in
interpreting economic behavior (M. Friedman, 1968). Thus there was
little consternation in the monetarist camp at the velocity collapse of
1981—83. Even though this velocity shift implied that nominal GNP in
late 1983 was about 10 percent lower than would have been predicted in
mid—1981 based on the historical growth of velocity, most monetarists
seemed unperturbed by this shift, and none were observed to confess the
need to abandon monetary targets under such circumstances.' This
indifference to drift in the predictions of short—run money—demand
1The 10 percent figure is the cumulative shortfall of Mi velocity in the
eight quarters of 1982 and 1983 from the 1969—80 trend. The correspond-
ing figure for M2 is 9 percent.8
functions may reflect the general monetarist belief that any deflection
of nominal GNP from the previously anticipated path will be reflected
mainly in prices rather than output over any but the shortest time
perspective.
2
Keynesians also have good reasons to be unperturbed by instability
in the short—run demand for money function. Some economists, mostly of
the Keynesian persuasion, have examined the possibility that the central
bank might target nominal GNP rather than one or more monetary
aggregates. tnoneversion of nominal GNP targeting, a desired growth
path of nominal GNP is chosen that yields the socially optimal
combination of inflation (p) and detrended output (Q), given the
constraint imposed by the economy's reduced—form Phillips curve:
(4) Pt =Pti
+ + +
Herefor convenience only one lagged value of inflation is entered,z
represents a vector of supply shock" variables, and c is an error
term.(4) can be combined with the identity:
(5) + y-q
where —qis excess nominal GNP growth, i.e., the excess of actual
nominal GNP growth (ye) over the trend or 'natural" growth rate of
2lronically, in light of hisearlierwritingsthatstress the long run,
M. Friedman has recently made widely publicized forecasts based on
extreme short—run quarter—to—quarter relationships. See Guzzardi (1984)
and M. Friedman (1984).
3Support and analysis can be found in Bean (1983), Feldstein (1984),
Gordon (1983), Hall (1983), Meade (1978), and Tobin (1980, 1983).9
output (q). This creates a two—equation model of the dynamic response
of output and inflation, that explains the behavior of Pt and given
the exogenous variables z, t and q. When an empirical estimate of
(4) is combined with (5), an optimal path of nominal GNP growth can be
determined that minimizes the policymakers' loss function.
If the primary short—run links between the policy instruments under
the Fed's immediate control and the nominal GNP target are short—term
interest rates, then there is little reason for concern with the short—
run demand for money function. Once a nominal GNP target path is chosen
from simulations of (4) and (5), the central bank would use its
influence on short—term nominal interest rates to "lean against"
deviations of forecast nominal GNP growth from the target path without
any reference to the money supply.4 In the context of nominal GNP
targeting, then, the supply of one or more arbitrarily defined monetary
aggregates would be shifted from central stage to backstage.5
It may require some mental readjustment for the economics
profession to demote the money supply to a second—order economic
4The scope for stabilizing nominal GNP through an interest—rate feedback
rule is demonstrated in Gordon (1984c).
51n this sentence the phrase "arbitrarily defined" refers to the
meaninglessness of the current distinction between Ml and M2. The
balances that I use for all my transactions in a "Fidelity USA" account
are included in M2, not Ml, whereas the "NOW" and "Super NOW" accounts
that provide inferior services at greater cost are included in both Ml
and M2. The distinction between MI and M2 tells us more about the
distribution of income and wealth than about the transaction motive for
holding money balances, since the only harrier to establishing a multi-
purpose interest—paying account like the Merrill—Lynch CMA or Fidelity
USA is a purely transitory entry deposit of $10,000 or $20,000. This
entry fee is transitory, because one can write a check against it the
instant the account is established and thereafter maintain an average
balance of close to zero.10
variable for short—run analysis. But events have now shown to be
obsolete the major reason to pay attention to money, that is, its
presumed causal connection with inflation. When the two years 1981—83
are compared with the decade average for 1970—80, the growth rate of Ml
accelerated by 2.6 percentage points and that of M2 by 0.7 percentage
points. If most economists had been told in 1980 that this acceleration
of monetary growth was about to occur, they would have predicted that
there would be a further acceleration in inflation. Yet, as everyone
knows, the actual outcome was a sharp reduction in the inflation rate,
from 9.2 percent in 1980 to 4.2 percent in 1983 for the GNP implicit
deflator.6 The recent experience conflicts with the much—quoted maxim
that "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" and
suggests its replacement with a new truism that (at least in the long
run) "inflation is always and everywhere an excess nominal GNP growth
phenomenon." That is, when output is growing at its long—run trend rate
and the output ratio is zero, (5) becomes:
Pt =
—
Theforegoing argument can be related to the role of money in the
simple IS—LM model of undergraduate macroeconomics textbooks. Once the
IS and LM curves are combined to form the economy's aggregate demand
schedule, there is no reason for special attention to the money
supply. If the supply of money is determined by the central bank
6The growth rate figures for Ml and M2 arequarterly rates expressed on
an annual basis for the eight quarters 1981:Ql through 1983:Q4 compared
with the average for the 44 quarters between l970:Q1 and 1980:Q4.
Inflation figures are annual averages.11
through its conduct of open market operations and discount rate policy,
those instruments (together with fiscal policy) are then the arguments
of the aggregate demand function. Most of the "big issues" in
macroeconomics, particularly the determinants of output fluctuations and
inflation, can be stated in terms of the interaction of this aggregate
demand schedule with an aggregate supply function, without need for
separate reference to the IS or LM curves. The one important topic that
requires the IS—LM apparatus, rather than the aggregate demand curve, is
the dependence of the interest rate on the mix of monetary and fiscal
policy. But even here the money supply is unimportant once the central
bank targets on nominal GNP, since now the "mix" issue can be translated
into a positive dependence of the natural rate of interest on the fiscal
deficit for any given level of nominal GNP.
These questions about the need for the short—run money demand
concept are related to Benjamin Friedman's (1977) critique of short—run
monetary targets. Friedman argued that an intermediate target procedure
based on the money stock hinders policymakers from making optimal use of
available information, but nevertheless money may still be an important
information variable. We argue that in a short—run context there is no
need for one or more monetary aggregate concepts to intervene between
the central bank's direct operating instruments and its ultimate
objective of controlling nominal GNP. The money stock continues to be
interesting only to the extent that its past values help the central
bank forecast deviations of nominal GNP growth from target, or to the
extent that money directly determines nominal GNP over and above the
contributions of the primary operating instruments of the central bank——
unborrowed reserves and short—term interest rates.12
III. ADJUSTMENT AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
Portfolio Adjustment Costs for an Individual
Equation (2) above is the standard approach to modelling the short—
run adjustment of real money balances for an individual. This approach,
which goes back to Eisner—Strotz (1963) and Griliches (1967), views an
agent as facing a tradeoff between the costs of being off his long—run
money—demand function (1), and transactions costs that are incurred in
proportion to the change per period in real balances. If we write the
two types of costs (K1 and K2) in quadratic form, and use the i
subscript to denote individual variables, we have:
(6) K1 =
(7) K2 =
Thecost—minimizing adjustment will take place according to (2), with
the adjustment parameter n =
However,doubt about the appropriateness of this adjustment
formulation arises from a consideration of alternative shocks to which
our representative agent may be subjected. Let desired holdings of real
balances in time period t depend on the expected level of the
individual's real income (Q) and of the opportunity cost of holding
money (R), where Rt is properly interpreted as the difference between
the interest paid on alternatives to money and the own—interest on
money:
(8) f(X) = ctQ+ a2Re.
The standard approach to the specification of the short—run demand for13
money assumes that we can maintain the individual adjustment equation
for analysis with aggregate data. Thus, dropping the "i" subscript,
when Q and R are replaced by their own current values, and (6) is
substituted into (3), and we allow for an error term, we have the
standard Goldfeld specification:
(9) Mt — = + (l_rD(M1—
+Ut.
This formulation implies that actual money holdings adjust with the
same coefficient (n) to changes in either output or interest rates. Yet
a consideration of individual portfolio behavior suggests that in
general the adjustment to income and interest rate changes should be
quite different.
Let us examine an agent's reaction to the following hypothetical
events:
A. An anticipated increase in real income due, say, to a
scheduled wage increase occurs on January 1. There is clearly no
adjustment cost in raising real balances if wages are paid in the form
of money. When income is paid in the form of money, as still occurs for
most labor income, dividends, and some kinds of proprietors' income, the
relevant portfolio adjustment cost is not in raising real money balances
in response to higher income, but rather in reducing the initial receipt
through reallocation to other forms of assets, e.g., savings accounts,
bonds, and equities.7
B. An unanticipated increase in real income causesnomore
7The major type of income paid in a form other than Ml is accrued
interest on assets not included in Ml, where interest is credited to the
account rather than paid by check.14
adjustment cost in raising real balances than a fully anticipated
increase, as long as income is paid in the form of money. The main
difference in the case of an income •surprise" is the presumed greater
magnitude of portfolio reallocation costs. For an individual managing a
portfolio consisting only of Ml and a savings account, when higher
income is expected in advance, Ml can he temporarily depleted in
anticipation of the forthcoming payment (thus reducing the excess to be
transferred to savings), whereas this advance depletion cannot occur in
the case of an income surprise.
C. A government transfer payment distributed in the form of
money, the classroom example of "helicopter money" or "money rain," is
identical to any other form of income surprise received in the form of
money. There is no portfolio adjustment cost in raising real balances,
but only in reducing them as part of the process of portfolio
reallocation.
D.If financial markets operate efficiently, then changes in
interest rates are unanticipated. Real money balances adjust slowly to
changes in interest rates for two reasons, both the delay in adjusting
expectations of the interest rate level in the determination of M, and
the partial closing of any gap between M and due to transaction
costs. Thus at the individual level gradual adjustment of real balances
makes sense for interest rates but not for real income, leading us to
question the specification in (3) that forces an identical adjustment
speed on each component of the "X" vector of independent variables.
E. From the individual point of viet, an open—market operation
is like any other cause of a change in interest rates. The government
bond purchase changes interest rates enough to induce sufficient15
portfolio holders to shift from bonds to money. A government transfer
financed by bond issue can he viewed as a combination of cases C and E,
with the recipients of the transfer payment actually paid in money,
while a concurrent open—market purchase shifts the portfolio of other
individuals by enough to leave the money supply constant.
F. Finally, consider a "price surprise" due to a higher price
of energy. Real income and real balances decline simultaneously. There
is no adjustment cost, because the individual does not control the price
level. The decline in real balances occurs effortlessly, without any
transactions taking place. Once again, as in the cases A, B, and C, the
change in real balances is observed to occur simultaneously with the
occurrence of the shock, with no adjustment lag or transaction cost
incurred.
Revision of the Standard Formulation of Short—run Dynamics
Two changes are suggested by this discussion for the standard
dynamic adjustment formulation in equations (2) and (3) above. First,
the absence of adjustment costs in response to a price surprise suggests
that it is costly to adjust nominal rather than real balances, so that
equation (2) should be rewritten in nominal form:
(2') Mt =XM+(1—X)M1, implying
(3') Mt =Xf(X)
+Xl+(X)M.
For estimation purposes (3') can be rewritten
(10) Mt —Pt
=Xf(X)+(I—X)(M1—P).
We can see that (10) is equivalent to the original "real' adjustment16
formulation (3), with the addition of a previously omitted variable, the
rate of inflation:
(10') Mt —Pt Xf(Xt) +(l—X)(M_i—P_i)
—
(l—A)(P—Pi).
In Goldfeld's classic paper (1973) that later yielded the "Goldfeld
puzzle," the real adjustment hypothesis was used as in (9). But in his
reexamination of the puzzle, Goldfeld (1976) shifted to the nominal
adjustment hypothesis. That this switch occurred after the 1973—75
"price surprises" is understandable, although Goldfeld (1976) did not
explicitly discuss the implausibility of (2) nor give more than cursory
attention to "price effects" (pp. 702—4).
The nominal adjustment scheme of (2') is more plausible than the
real adjustment hypothesis of (2), but it still constrains the adjust-
ment of real balances to all the components of the X vector to he
identical. An interesting point to note about (10) is that dPt/dMt
=1/X> 1,whereas in the long run dPt/dM =1.This implausible
structure is another symptom of the more general problem that the
reasons given for gradual adjustment of nominal or real money balances
in the case of an individual actually imply overshooting and non—
gradually—adjusting price behavior in the aggregate.8
The basic problem encountered in cases A, B, and C, the fact that
income is paid in the form of money, can he surmounted by distinguishing
between money holdings at the end of the last period and at the
beginning of this period, If we denote money holdings at the beginning
of a period as M't and at the end of a period as M, and if we designate
8i am grateful to Jim Clouse for this point.17
as the receipt of money at the beginning of the period in the form
of expected or unexpected income or a government transfer payment, then
Mt_i +m.
Thus (2') is replaced as the adjustment equation by:9
(2") XM +(l)(lt_i+mP.
To provide a specific example of the implications of (2") for
empirically estimated money demand equations, let us adopt as a
hypothesis about expectations that the income concept relevant for money
demand (Q) is Friedman's "permanent income' (1959), estimated from a
geometrically declining distributed lag, and that the interest rate is
expected to follow a random walk:
j=0
(12) =Ri.
When (11) and (12) substituted into (8), and then into (2"), we have:




Now let us assume that a windfall gain in real income occurs (c'),
and that it is paid out in rioney at the beginning of the period
(c =mi).Then with the additional simplifying assumption that income
9Coats (1982) derives an equation in the form (2") but does not pursue
its implications as in (13) —(15)below. Laidler (1982) also intro-
duces the distinction between individual money holdings at the end of
last period and at the beginning of this period.18







The second term in brackets is the coefficient on the current innovation
in income, and this is quite different from the coefficient (Xc) that
is implied by the conventional approach (7). More generally, allowing a
separate innovation over each period in the past, (14) can he general-
ized to:
(15) t
= +a1(Q0+(1-) +2Ri + Pl
+
Aninspection of (15) reveals three aspects of dynamic adjustment that
are ignored in the conventional specification (9). These are (a) the
inclusion of lagged terms as well as the current term for real output,
(b) the difference in the coefficient on the current output innovation
from the geometric structure of the coefficients on lagged output inno-
vations, and (c) the different adjustment lag for output changes than
for interest rate changes. A further feature of this analysis is the
dependence of the coefficient on current output on the assumption that
all of the current income innovation is paid in the form of money.
If only a fraction is paid as money, the coefficient would he different,
and in an aggregate time series context the coefficient on income might
change over time with shifts in payment practices and technology.19
IV.THEAGGREGATE LEVEL
The preceding analysis follows the usual practice of making no
distinction between the individual and aggregate level. The "i"
subscript was introduced in the statement of adjustment costs perceived
by an individual in equations (6) and (7), but otherwise variables were
written without the "1" subscript, as if the reference agent's behavior
could be treated without qualification as identical to that of the
aggregate economy. Laidler (1982) has also examined the distinction
between the individual and aggregate levels, and has developed alter-
native interpretations of the coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable appearing in equations like (3) or (10). We shall not repeat
here his analysis of the distinction between portfolio adjustment costs
and the formation of expectations about permanent income, Rather, we
provide here a further analysis of two other issues that arise at the
aggregate level. Individuals are price takers and are not concerned
with price adjustment, but prices must somehow adjust at the aggregate
level; problems introduced by gradual price adjustment are examined in
the next section. Subsequently we examine problems introduced by the
possibility that nominal money is partly or completely exogenous at the
aggregate level.
The Gradual Adjustment of Prices
Much of my recent research has emphasized an approach to macro-
economic analysis that combines the long—run neutrality aspects of the
natural rate hypothesis with the short—run gradual adjustmnt of prices
("NRH—GAP"). In Gordon (1982a) I showed that this approach could make
sense of the behavior of output and price changes in quarterly data back20
to 1890 and could explain postwar observations with a standard error
several orders of magnitude smaller than the parallel research of Barro
and Rush (1980). Some of the implications of gradual price adjustment,
together with proposed explanations of sticky price behavior in product
markets, are provided in Gordon (1981) and Okun (1981). Here we examine
the main implications for the dynamic specification of short—runmoney
demand equations.
Laidler (1982) derives an adjustment equation in which agents are
always on their demand function for nominal balances, but in contrast
the aggregate price level adjusts slowly to its equilibrium level. Here
we allow gradual adjustment of both nominal balances and the price
level, and derive a more general dynamic specification of which
Laidler's is a special case. To make this more general analysis
possible, it is necessary to assume that current nominal GNP (Ye) is
predetermined. Implicitly we assume that nominal GNP evolves as a
function of a set of past variables, including hank reserves, interest
rates, government spending, and tax rates.
Then, given the current value of nominal GNP, we define two
equilibrium concepts, the equilibrium price level and the equilibrium
money stock as follows:
(16) = — Q,and
(16') M =Y
-v(x).
Here in (16) the equilibrium price level (Pt) is defined as that which
will make the predetermined current level of nominal GNP compatible
with the 'natural' level of real GNP (Q), which is assumed to he
exogenous. In (16') the equilibrium money supply (Mt)isdefined as21
that which will be demanded at the current level of nominal CNP, given
the velocity of money, which is written as a function of the explanatory
variables in the long—run money demand function [V(X)]. Since nominal
GNP can be decomposed into the current price level and current real CNP
= +Q),(16') is identical to the long run demand for money
function (1) above, with f(X) =— V(Xt).Nominal balances adjust in
the standard way, from (2'), with an error term now added:
* M (17 N =AM+(1—X)M ÷ c
t t t—it
Inthis section we simplify the exposition by ignoring the distinction
in (2") between money at the end of one period and the beginning of the
next.
Now let us assume that the price level (Pt) adjusts gradually to
its equilibrium level (P), except when there is a "price shock" (e):
* p
(18) P = +(l—v)P1
+c.
We can add more substance to (18) by replacing the term with a
coefficient times the supply shock vector from (4) plus a serially
uncorrelated error term
* p
(18') Pt =liPt+ (l_i.1)P +
y3z
+
Thisformulation implies that supply shocks are ignored in the
determination of P.'0
10This is consistent with the idea that adverse supply shocks have an
inflationary impact only to the extent that nominal wages fai to
decline to their lower equilibrium level. In this context is
interpreted as the "no shock natural output level" that ignores the
transitory decline in output after a supply shock that occurs as a22
To derive the implications of these assumptions for the behavior of
real balances, we first combine (16) and (16') to eliminate then
substitute the resulting relation between M and P into (17), and then
use the resulting expression to substitute for P in (18'), yielding:
(19) Pt =(l)1
— — v(x)j+![u(M_(l-X)M1 —
+ Y3zt +
Withsome further manipulation, we can write the implied equation for
real balances:
* 1
(20) M = — v(x)j+Xtt—1
+P(l_X)(I
+ - —
Thisform (20) is a convenient one for discussing the implications
of gradual price adjustment. First, we note that if agents are always
on their money demand function, then X =1.If we neglect the supply




which is Laidler's result (1982, equation 23).h1 Laidler claims that
lags in price adjustment (p < 1) provide the "best available explana—
UThis result is also repeated in equation (9) in Laidler's commenton
Gordon (1984a).23
don" of the presence of the lagged dependent variable in an equation
like (21), although from (20) we can see that the matter is more in-
volved if A 1, in which case there are two lagged dependent variables
(Mt—Pt_i and Mt_i—Pt_i), each with coefficients that depend on both the
speed of price adjustment (ii)andof portfolio adjustment (A).
Another implication of the analysis, omitted from (21) but present
in (20), is that the supply shock variables (zt) belong in the money
demand equation with a negative sign. The supply shock variables that
turn out to be relevant in the Phillips curve (4) are serially
correlated and have, taken together, a uniformly positive influence on
inflation during almost every quarter between i973:Q1 and 1975:Q4.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
Figure 1 plots the cumulative values of z against the prediction error
of the Coldfeld money demand specification (6), and shows that the two
move together with opposite signs.2
To summarize this section, we note that our basic equation (20) can
be related to the standard Goldfeld specification (3) if we make just
two changes. First, we nust set the two adjustment coefficients equal
'2The inflation equation is that estimated in Cordon—King (1982), where
the supply shock vector contains four variables, all of which are
positive during most or all of the 1973—75 period, (a) the change in the
personal consumption deflator minus the change in that deflator net of
expenditures on food and energy, i.e., the effect on consumption prices
of changes in the relative prices of food and energy, (b) the change in
the relative price of imports, (c) the change in the effective exchange
rate of the dollar, and (d) a dummy for the rebound after the Nixon
price controls that is in effect during 1974:Q2 through 1975:Q1. The
top frame plots the dynamic simulation forecasting error of the equation





















































































































































to each other (ii= A),and, second, we must drop the price innovation
terms. This yields:
(22) —= Af(X)+(l_X)(Mti_Pci) +M.
Thus the Goldfeld specification is a special case that constrains the
two adjustment speeds to be equal and ignores the presence of an error
term in the price equation. Because that omitted error term is serially
correlated, given the evidence produced by studies of inflation, it is
not surprising that serial correlation has been present in estimated
versions of (22).
Money Demand or Money Supply Function?
At, the individual level, prices, income, and interest rates are all
taken to be exogenous, and agents are assumed to adjust nominal balances
in response to changes in these exogenous variables. To convert a
specification derived at the individual level into one appropriate for
estimation with aggregate data, it must he assumed in parallel fashion
that the aggregate nominal money supply is completely passive in the
face of changes in each argument in the demand for money function. But
when the money supply or monetary base is set by the central hank in a
way that nkes money respond less than completely to the arguments of
the money demand function, the estimated parameters cannot reveal the
parameters of the demand for money function. This "impossibility
theorem" has been discussed by Cooley and LeRoy (1981), who claim that
the interest elasticity of money demand cannot be identified. Here we
examine identification and simultaneity issues in the context of two
specific feedback rules for the central bank.25
In this discussion we use a stripped—down demand function for real
balances:
(23) —= aQ+ +
inan economy that also has a money supply function relating nominal




The first of two alternative monetary control rules, the central bank




Implementationof this rule makes the monetary base endogenous with
respect to the arguments of the money demand function and the errors in
the money supply and interest rate equations:





Possibledifficulties in estimating the money demand function (23)
include inconsistency in the case of (a) correlation between and
or (b) an effect of the current money supply on R, which will
make c correlated with Rt, or (c) autocorrelation of together with
an effect of the lagged money supply on R.
The problem becomes much worse if the Federal Reserve follows a
feedback control rule for the monetary base, allowing the desired base
B to respond to output and the inflation rate:
(27) B =B0
++ 2tt—126
In (27) the coefficients and 11)2arenegative if the Fed pursues a
countercyclical policy. With partial adjustment of the actual base to
its desired value, we have:
* B
(28) Bt =+ (l—)Bi+
= [B0+ + +(1—)Bi
+E.
When(24) is used to substitute for Br_i in (28), and then (28) is
substituted back into (24) for B, we can write the money supply as:
(29) =1[B0÷ +2 tt—l
+2t
÷ (1—4)[M51 2Rtl — + s+
Withsome rearrangement we can rewrite (29) as an equation that
determines real balances:
(30) —P





Herewe have real balances determined by all the familiar variables in
the standard Goldfeld specification (9) —— Q,R,and lagged M—P. There
are a few additional variables, but we have already seen that these were
arbitrarily excluded from (9), including the lagged interest rate Rt_i
(which appeared above in (15)), and inflation (which appeared as an
innovation in (20) as well as directly in (10')). We note also that the
error term is serially correlated, a usual feature of estimated versions
of (9).27
A New Interpretation of Parameter Instability
It is clear that estimation of an equation containing most or all
of the variables in (30) may tell us nothing about the parameters in the
underlying money demand function, if the central bank has followed a
control rule like (28). More important, the interpretation of any such
estimated equation will he strongly influenced when the central bank
shifts from an interest rate rule like (25) to a base rule like (28).
For instance, in the Goldfeld equation the coefficient on output should
be positive when (25) is in effect, but it may shift to negative when
(28) is in effect, since in (30) the output coefficient appears in the
form 8P1, withand positive and negative. Similarly, under
the interest—rate rule, the coefficient on the interest rate should be
negative (although it may he biased by correlation between the two error
R d
terms and c). But in (30) the coefficient on the current interest
rate is positive and equal to 82, the interest elasticity in the money
supply function, while the coefficient on the lagged interest rate is
zero. The closeris to zero, the closer the interest rate effect
approaches a first difference with a positive sum of coefficients. Only
if base adjustment in (28) is instantaneous does the lagged interest
rate effect disappear.
Some investigators have estimated money demand equations over vary-
ing sample periods, with the stated intention of studying changes in the
income and interest rate elasticities of the demand for money. Yet such
coefficient shifts may tell us more about changes in policy rules than
about the characteristics of the underlying money demand function. This
task is made particularly difficult in the tJnited States by the eclectic
behavior of the Fed, which in some periods has "leaned against the wind"28
of changing interest rates without stabilizing them completely, while in
other periods has attempted without much success to stabilize the growth
rates of one or more monetary aggregates. Thus the typical policy
regime has been a mixture of interest rate and money stabilization, and
as a result the coefficients in a Goldfeld—type specification are likely
to represent a blend of money demand parameters with the supply param-
eters of (30), and shifts in the estimated coefficients are as likely to
tell us about shifts in the policy mix as about responses of money
demand behavior.
V. DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION AND ERROR CORRECTION
The previous analysis suggested that the standard approach to the
specification of money demand equations is subject to serious problems
of misspecification and identification. Simple examples indicated that
the usual Coldfeld specification imposes several arbitrary exclusion
restrictions, including (a) the omission of lagged output variables in
addition to current output, (b) the imposition of the same lag distribu-
tion on output and one or more interest rate variables, and (c) the
omission of variables to represent supply shocks or other sources of
systematic shifts in the price level. The identification problem arises
because (d) an econometric equation linking real balances to output and
interest rates, with assorted lagged money and price terms, may be
derived from either a model of money supply or money demand. The co-
efficients in the standard equation can he interpreted as parameters of
money demand only if the central bank has followed a regime of interest
rate stabilization, and instability in coefficients of standard equa-
tions maytellus more about shifts in central hank regimes than about29
shifts in money demand behavior.
The empirical section of this paper estimates equations in which
real balances appear on the left—hand side, and standard explanatory
variables (output and interest rates) appear on the right—hand side.
The novelty consists of examining results for several alternative
arrangements of these variables to determine the effect on previous
results of dynamic misspecification (points a and b above); the
introduction of proxies for supply shocks from my previous work on
inflation to determine the importance of point (c) above, and an
interpretation of remaining shifts in coefficients in terms of the money
supply vs. money demand identification issue, point (d) above.
Dynamic Specification in the General Single—Equation Case
The standard partial adjustment model is only one of several






where d(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator (L). Hendry, Pagan, and
Sargan (1982), hereafter liPS, present a useful "typology" of alternative
types of dynamic models based on the first—order version of (31):13
(32) = + + + 3—i+
Thisis assumed to be a structural relationship, with X weakly
exogenous and the error term assumed to be white noise. The notable
'3An earlier exposition of the typology is provided by Hendry (1980a).30
features of (32) are that both current and lagged explanatory variables
appear, in addition to the lagged dependent variable, and that both Y
and X are entered as levels rather than differences. The standard
partial adjustment model that has dominated the money—demand literature
is a special case of (32):
=+ lt+
83't—1÷ e,
where 82 in (32) is assumed to be zero.
HPS develop a taxonomy of nine different versions of (32), differ-
ing in the assumed parameter restrictions, of which partial adjustment
(33) is only one. In this section we contrast (33) with two of the
eight other possibilities that seem most promising for the study of the
short—run dynamics of money demand, that is, the first—difference and
error—correction models. Interested readers are referred to HPS for the
full typology of nine models, which they point out
"describe very different lag shapes and long—run responses of Y
to X, have different advantages and drawbacks as descriptions of
economic time series, are differentially affected by various
misspecifications and prompt generalisations which induce
different research avenues and strategies." (HPS, 1982, p. 27)
The most important weakness of partial adjustment is the
possibility of invalid exclusion of X_1 (or in the more general case
all relevant lags of Xe). In turn this may result in reaching the
erroneous conclusion that speeds of adjustment are slow when in fact
they are not. Further, many derivations of partial adjustriient equations
like (33) entail that e is autocorrelated, leading to the usual
statistical problems. These two problems interact, since the31
coefficient 83 is biased upward in the presence of positive serial
correlation, leading to an overstatement of the mean adjustment lag
831(183). Goldfeld and his followers uniformly adopt the Cochrane—
Orcutt "rho—correction" method of correction for serial correlation and
obtain significant positive values of rho, with little comment regarding
the implication that the original untransformed equation like (33) may
he misspecified (either by imposing 82 =0or by omitting one or more
relevant explanatory variables).
"Differenced data" models are another special case of (32) that
impose two restrictions, 83 =1and 82 —8i:
(34) =+ 8x+e.
Here we retain our earlier notational device of using lower case letters
to represent differences in logs in contrast to upper—case letters that
continue to represent log levels. Differencing is often recommended as
a simple way to achieve stationarity and to avoid the spurious
regression problem, e.g., by Granger and Newbold (1974) and Plosser and
Schwert (1978). In an earlier paper on money demand (1984a) I showed
that a differenced data specification for the Goldfeld variables yields
much smaller post—1972 errors in dynamic simulations than the log—level
partial adjustment specification, especially when the dependent variable
is differenced nominal rather than real money. However, this result is
subject to the same criticism as any application of the general
'4Further, Hendry (1980), p. 97, shows that the skewness imposed on the
lag distribution by (33) yields a mean lag that is 50 percent higher
than the median lag when is estimated to be 0.95, as sometimes occurs
in money demand studies.32
differencedform, that the equilibrium solution to (34) is left
indeterminant. In fact, if f3, =0and et in (34) is white noise, then
there is no long—run relationship between the levels of Y and X.
This disadvantage of the differenced format is avoided by shifting
to the "error—correction mechanism' (ECM) that has been studied and
advocated by David Hendry (1980a), James Davidson (1984a), and their
variousco—authors, with applications to the study of U. K. money demand
equations in Hendry (1980b), and Davidson (1984b). The ECM takes the
originalgeneral dynamic equation (32) and imposes the restriction that
÷ 2 += 1:
=o+1x
+(1_3)(X_Y)t+e.
Notice that the differenced equation (34) is a special case of (35) that
imposes the additional restriction that =1,implying that since
= = The phrase "error correction comes from the fact
that with y =x=e=0,from (35) we have YX, so that the term
(X—Y)t_i measures the "error" in the previous period, and agents
"correct" their decision about Y in light of this disequilibrium. The
differenced format of (34) by contrast allows the level of to wander
about without any tendency toward correction.
Some of the examples in the literature have assumed that in equi-
librium Y has a unitary long—run elasticity to changes in X.If we we
let g represent the steady state growth rate of both X and Y, then we







Theproportionality assumption might be appropriate for relations that
seem to exhibit a unitary elasticity over a long period, e.g., the
demand for M2 in the U. S. where the velocity of M2 is observed to be
roughly constant since 1960. For the study of some other relationships,
e.g., the demand for Ml, the proportionality assumption may not be
appropriate, and the ECM model can he written:
(38) y= 81x+(1—8.)(X—Y),+(8,+8.+8—1)X1+e
II. -) L1 I ZJLL L
= Süx+Si(x—Y)_i
+cS2Xi,
and the restriction =0in (35) can be tested directly. If the




Almost all of the empirical applications of the ECM have been to
U. K. data, and itremainsto be seen whether this approach can shed
lighton the short—run behavior of the demand for money in the U. S. At
least in principle, the main advantage oftheECM approach over simple
differencing is that it provides a sensible long—run interpretation, as
in(37) and (39).
Applicationto the Short—Run Demand for Money
The empirical section of the paper studies the sensitivity of
coefficientestimates, post—sample dynamic simulation errors, and Chow
test measures of structural shift to alternative forms of dynamic
specification, while maintaining a uniform sample period and set of34
explanatory variables. In each equation the dependent variable is the
level or first difference of the log of real Ml, using the GNP deflator
as the price index to deflate Ml. The explanatory variables are real
GNP, the GNP deflator, the Treasury bill rate, the savings deposit rate,
and the lagged dependent variable.
The only difference in the data used in this paper, compared to
most earlier research, concerns the interest rate variables. As stated
above in connection with (8), the interest rate that enters into the
money demand equation should he the opportunity cost of holding money.
Previous research on the demand for Ni, by including a short—term market
rate like the Treasury bill or commercial paper rate, as well as the
savings deposit rate, has implicitly assumed that own—return on Ml is
zero. Here we enter both the Treasury bill rate and savings deposit
rate as the excess over the own—return on Ml, using a series for the
latter provided by Michael Hamburger. The Hamburger own—rate series
measures only the pecuniary return on Ml, not the implicit services
received by holders of demand deposits, and ranges from zero before 1963
to a modest 1.3 percent in late 1983. This figure represents the
weighted average of the zero pecuniary return on currency and
conventional demand deposits, with the positive rates received on NOW,
super NOW, and other interest—bearing accounts in Ml. The savings
deposit rate is the average of one series provided by Goldfeld and one
by Hamburger. While these are similar before 1974, after that date they
differ, and so we used an unweighted average of the two.
Our choice of alternative dynamic specifications is mOtivated in
part by the analysis of the short—run demand for money in the earlier
sections of the paper. Our suggestion that the demand for real balances35
should respond with different lags to changes in output, prices, and the
interest rate is pursued by introducing a set of additional uncon-
strained distributed lags into the standard partial adjustment formula-
tion. Our analysis of supply shocks is followed up by introducing a
proxy for the effects of supply shocks into the equation for real
balances. Finally, the identification problem introduced by the
possible existence of a money supply or reaction function helps to guide
our interpretation of shifts in coefficients after 1973.
The alternative models of dynamic specification begin with Model A,
the standard partial adjustment equation used by Goldfeld and most of
his followers. This corresponds in our general notation to (33), which
has the notable features that no lagged values of any independent
variables are included, and only a single lag of the dependent variable.
Model B introduces a proxy for supply shocks into the same partial
adjustment specification. Model C loosens the dynamic restrictions
imposed by the usual partial adjustment model by adding four lags of
each explanatory variable, as well as the second through fourth lag of
the dependent variable. This generalized dynamic model explaining the
log level of real balances in terms of the lagged values of N
explanatory variables (X) can he written as:
(40) =
j=O j1 N+1,j Y_ +e.
Model 1) is like C but loosens the restriction in the Goldfeld formula-
tion that excludes the current and lagged price level, which amounts to
imposing the assumption that the demand for real balances is homogeneous
of degree zero in prices instantaneously. Models C and D share with B
the inclusion of the same proxy for supply shocks, in each case entered36
as a current value and four lagged values.
Model E is the differenced data format for the change in the log of
real balances. This is estimated in an unrestricted format that is
parallel to (40) and includes the current value as well as four lagged
changes for each independent variable, and four lagged changes of the
dependent variable. This is the generalization of the "differenced
data" model suggested by HPS (1982, P. 27):
NL L
(41) v=8.+ 15' 8x. + 5' v +e - --t u i1 j 1,t—j.'N+l,j't—i t
The last model (F) is the error correction model (ECM), generalized
to be symmetric with (41) by allowing for multiple lags:
(42) =o iji,t_j + N+l(X_Y)t_l + N+i+1Xt_L_1+ et. 1=1 3=0 i=1
Here the differenced independent variables are entered exactly as in
(41). Then comes the error correction term. The final set of terms
consists of each independent variable, entered as one additional lag
beyond L, to test the possible non—proportionality of Y to X in the
steady state.
VI.EMPIRICALRESULTS
BasicResults for the Six Models
Results are shown in Table 1.Thesix columns correspond to the
sixmodels, estimated over the sample period 1956:Q3—1972:Q4. In
addition to the coefficients (or sums of coefficients where lagged
variables are involved), and the adlusted R2 and standard error, the
Cochrane—Orcutt "rho" coefficient of serial correlation is shown for the36A
TABLE 1
Alternative Dynamic Specifications
for Sample Period 1956:Q3—1972:Q4
and Post—1972 Dynamic Simulation Errors
Dependent Variable: Real Ml
Partial Add
Adjustment, Supply Add Add Differenced Error
No lags on X Shocks Lags Deflator Data Correction
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
0.18** 0.17** 0.06 0.14*
0.73 0.68
EP _O.07** t—i
EP —0.03 0.14 t—i
TB OOI* —0.01 —0.01 —0.01 t—1
ERTB —0.03* —0.05 t—i
SD _0.U3* _U.03* —0.01 -0.01
ESD —0.11k —0.13 t—1








.992 .992 .994 .995 .523 .563




(to76/83) 4.7/ 11.84.3/10.0 4.9/ 9.8 2.0/ 2.43.3/ t.3 6.1/ 11.0
Mean Error
(to 76/83) —3.9/—10.1 —2.8/—8.5 —3.91—8.80.6/—0.3—2.11—5.3—5.1/—10.0
Note:Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent (*) or 1 percent (**)
levels. All equations also include constant terms.37
Goldfeld specification in the first two columns; this transformation is
not applied in the other columns where the inclusion of four values of
the lagged dependent variable is sufficient to eliminate the serial
correlation problem. The bottom of the table lists both root mean—
squared errors and mean errors in dynamic simulations for the 1973—83
period (1973—76 and 1973—83 errors are shown separately). These
simulations are "dynamic" in the sense that they generate the lagged
dependent variable endogenously while treating as exogenous all of the
other variables. The dynamic simulations of the ECM generate the lagged
velocity variable endogenously as the ratio of exogenous P+Q to
endogenousM.
Thefirstcolumn exhibits the results for the standard "first
order" partial adjustment formulation, model A. The familiar post—
sample dynamic simulation errors occur when the 1958—72 equation is
extrapolated beyond its sample period; the RMSE in the dynamic
simulation for 1973—83 is 11.8 percent, and the mean error is —10.1
percent (that is, actual less than predicted). This is the simulation
error that Is plotted in the bottom frame of Figure 1 above. The long—
run elasticities implied by the coefficients for Model A are 0.49 for
income and —0.11 for the two interest rates taken together; both of
these are smaller than in the original Goldfeld paper, reflecting some
combination of data revisions and our slightly different treatment of
the opportunity cost of holding money. As always occurs with model A,
there is is significant positive serial correlation, as indicated by the
significant estimated "rho" coefficient of 0.41.
Model B is identical to model A but adds the current and four
lagged values of a proxy for the influence of supply shocks on the rate38
of inflation. This proxy is taken from my earlier work on the U. S.
inflation process (Gordon—King, 1982), and consists of the actual values
of four variables representing the influence of supply shocks, times
their coefficients estimated in a reduced—form equation like (4) above
that explains the inflation rate.15 The top frame of Figure 1 shows the
cumulative value (i.e., the integral) of this supply—shock proxy. The
proxy has the expected negative sign, and the sum of coefficients of
—1.72 is significant at the 5 percent level. The simulation errors of
model B are unIformly smaller than those of model A, but only by a
relatively small amount.
Model C contains the same variables as model B but adds four lagged
values of each explanatory variable, as well as lags two through four of
the dependent variable. The additional lags are -jointly significant,
with F(15,41) =2.00,slightly above the 5 percent significance level of
1.92. However, there is no improvement in the dynamic simulation
errors, which are almost as large as for Nodel A. Also notable is the
substantial drop in the sum of coefficients on the supply shock proxy.
A further improvement in fit, and a dramatic improvement in post—
sample simulation performance, occurs when the current and four lagged
values of the GNP deflator (P) are added to model C, and these results
are shown as model D. The sum of coefficients on the price variable is
significant at better than the one percent level, and the addition of
the price variable also causes the sum of coefficients on the supply—
shock proxy to jump to —2.26, which just misses significance at the 5
percent level. The F(5,36) ratio on the addition of the filve price
'5Details are given in footnote 12 above.39
terms is 3.19, as compared to the 5 percent significance level of
2.48. Overall, the F(25,36) ratio on the addition of all the 25 extra
terms in model D, as compared to model A, is 2.76, as compared to the
one percent significance level of 2.30.
The dynamic simulation performance of model D is dramatically
better than any of the others. The root mean squared error for the
1973—83 simulation is only 2.4 percent, as compared to 11.8 percent for
model A. The mean error is only —0.3 percent, as compared to —10.1
percent. In fact in 1982:Q4, the 40th quarter of the simulation, the
error is only 1.4 percent (alt1tough it grows to 5.2 percent in l983:Q4
as part of the 1982—83 velocity puzzle discussed below).
The final two columns display results for the two models that
explain the difference of the log of real balances, the differenced—data
model E, and the error correction model F. The standard errors in these
equations are comparable to those in models A through D, since the
variables are defined as differences in logs (for convenience the
stardard errors are multiplied by 100 and displayed as percentages).
Models E and F have lower standard errors than models A and B, but
higher errors than the unrestricted models C and D.It is interesting
tonote that models D and E have exactly the samenumber of degrees of
freedom,but the sum of squared residuals for the former is 30percent
lessthan for the latter. The simulation performance of model E is the
second best in Table 1, better than any of the others except for model
D. 16
'6The model that performed best inmy earlier paper (1984a) was a
"nominal" differenced data equation in which the difference of the log
of nominal money was regressed on the log difference of nominal GNP and40
The results for the error—correction model (F) are not particularly
promising. None of the added variables (the lagged levels of velocity,
output, and interest rates) is significant, and the F(4,32) ratio on the
addition of the four level variables not present in model E is 1.83,
well short of the 5 percent significance level of 2.67. Further, the
dynamic simulation performance is as poor as that of model A. The best
thing that can be said about model F is that the error—correction term,
which is lagged velocity (equivalent to X—Y in (42) above) has the
correct sign and is of a plausible magnitude. The signs on the other
level varibles are also correct, and that on lagged output implies a
long—run income elasticity of 0.92 (using equation (39)).
Proponents of the ECM approach might object that there are too many
variables and too few degrees of freedom in model F as estimated in
Table 1. To address this issue a "truncated model F" was estimated,
with 13 fewer variables. Lags two through four were omitted for output
and both interest rates, and lags one through four were omitted for the
price level. The resulting truncated equation has a slightly lower
standard error and higher adjusted R2, and the coefficient on the error—
correction term is close to the 5 percent significance level. However,
there is no improvement in the post—1972 simulation performance.'7
the other variables in Table 1. A reestimated version of this model
does not fit as well as model E, although it yields a slightly better
simulation performance.
'7The root—mean squared and mean errors for 1973—83 are about the same
as for model F in Table 1, although the 1973—76 errors are smaller
(about the same as those for model E).Thelong—run income elasticity
is 0.85.41
The Carter Credit Controls and Shifts in Monetary Regimes
The technique of dynamic simulation is only one of several possible
ways in which the hypothesis of structural shift can be assessed. Some
writers have objected to the dynamic simulation technique, because it
imposes an overly sharp dichotomy between the dependent variable and the
explanatory variables, since it generates calculated values only for the
dependent and lagged dependent variables while using actual historical
values for the explanatory variables. Our earlier discussion of
identification issues tends to support this reason for skepticism of
dynamic simulation results and suggests that neither output nor interest
rates may usefully be treated •as exogenous during the post—1972 period
if during that period the Federal Reserve attempted (even
unsuccessfully) to stabilize the growth rate of the monetary base or
money supply.
An alternative measure of structural change is the standard Chow
test. In this section we report results for three different Chow tests,
each of which is based on an F ratio that compares the residual sum of
squares for a shorter period with that for a period with the same
initial date but a later termination date. The first test compares
equations for 1956—72 and 1956—76, thus measuring the significance of a
structural break in 1973:Q1. The second compares equations for 1956—72
and 1956—83, thus providing an alternative measure of the significance
of a structural break in 1973. The third test compares equations for
1956—79 and 1956—83, thus measuring the significance of a structural
break in 1980:Q1,
In preliminary work on this topic, it became apparentthat much of
the appearance of a structural shift after 1979 could be accounted for
by extremely high residuals in 1980:Q2 and l98O:Q3. These were almost42
always of opposite sign and roughly equal in magnitude, supporting the
conjecture that the Carter credit controls sharply reduced the money
supply in 1980:Q2 and contributed to a rebound of roughly the same
magnitude in 1980:Q3. The residuals in those quarters each have a value
of between 2 and 3 percent at a quarterly rate, or about 10 percent at
an annual rate. The residual sum of squares in the 1956—83 equation
declines by as much as one—third when these two quarters are "dummied
out," and this seems to be a sensible procedure for such an unusual and
short—lived event (analogous to the treatment of auto or steel strikes
in studies of employment or productivity behavior).
The results of the Chow tests are shown in Table 2. The first two
columns exhibit the alternative tests for a break in 1973:Ql, and the
third column shows the test for a break in 1980:Q1 (including the two
dummy variables in the extended 1956—83 equation). The results seem to
fall into two groups, models A—D and E—F. In the first four models the
hypothesis of no structural shift seems to be rejected strongly,
although it is interesting to note that the F ratios decline in both
size and significance in making the transition from model A to model
D.In contrast the hypothesis of no structural shift in 1973 seems to
he accepted for models E and F, and of no structural shift in 1979 for
model F. The truncated version of model F sends mixed signals.
The results summarized here can be compared with those reported
recently by Rose (1984), whose basic equation is a truncated version of
the error—correction model.18 Rose finds no structural shift in the
18The study by Rose (1984) differs from ours in a number of details,
including the use of seasonally unadjusted data, and a break point of
1974:Q1 rather than 1973:Q1. No attempt has been made here duplicate
Rose's results, and so our guess as to the reason for the partial
difference in his findings must be viewed as a conjecture.42A
TABLE 2
Chow Tests for Structural Shift
(Each cell shows an F ratio above and
degrees of freedom below;








A 5.14** 359** 3•57**
(16,61) (41,61) (13,89)
B 2.44** 3.15** 437**
(16,56) (41,56) (13,84)
C 1.89 2.90** 2.91**
(16,41) (41,41) (13,69)
D 2.23* 2.36** 2.34*
(16,36) (41,36) (13,64)
E 1.35 1.29 1.87*
(16,36) (41,36) (13,64)
F 1.18 1.43 1.45
(16,32) (41,32) (13,60)
Truncated F 1.71 2.18** 1.59
(16,45) (41,45) (13,73)43
mid—1970s "Goldfeld puzzle" period, but a sharp structural shift in the
1980s. The first column of Table 2 also finds no shift in 1973:Q1 for
the full and truncated versions of model F. However, our results differ
from Rose in finding no evidence of a break in 1980:Q1. This difference
is probably due to the absence of any attention by Rose to the special
nature of the Carter credit control period.
Further insight on the nature of the post—1972 shift is provided by
Table 3, which exhibits parallel equations for the 1956—72 and 1956—83
ono, n 1anor4n r10 Fars-i-. raa ft-ho inn tl a 1 a Aflnn Cl 1? -Ti-,4 an roe ant- , .- 4 nn •'—''—--—'-,, ", j—,
isintended to focus on the nature of coefficient shifts required by the
various models to "explain" the behavior of real balances in the post—
1972 period, in light of the identification issue raised earlier in the
context of money supply and money reaction functions. There we noted
that a shift by the central bank from an interest—rate stabilization
regime to a monetary base stabilization regime will tend to cause
systematic coefficient shifts in an equation explaining real balances
(see equation (30) above). In particular, the coefficient on output may
shift from positive to negative, there may be a negative effect of the
inflation rate, and the coefficient on the interest rate may shift from
negative to positive.
There is some support in Table 3 for this analysis. In all three
models there is a marked reduction in the size of the coefficient on
output, and that coefficient even turns slightly negative in column
(6). The coefficient on both interest rate terms declines in absolute
value for models D and F, and the savings deposit rate coefficient
changes sign for model A. Further, in model F the coefficients on both
the inflation rate and the supply shock proxy become significantly4 3A
TABLE 3
Alternative Dynamic Specifications
for Sample Period 1956—Q3--1972:Q4
and Post—1972 Dynamic Simulation Errors













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.18** 0.11* 0.14* 0.02
0.68 —0.01





ESD —0.13 —0.04 t—i








Dummy 80:Q2 _0.02** _0.02** _0.02**
Dummy 80:Q3 0.01 0.02** 0.03**
—2
.992 .999 .995 .991 .563 .718
S.E.E.(%) 0.50 0.65 0.38 0.50 0.43 0.48
p 0.41* 0.41*
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent (*) or 1 percent (**)
levels. All equations also include constant terms.44
negative, which would be consistent with the negative coefficient on the
inflation term in the reduced—form real balance equation (30) above,
reflecting the assumed monetary control regime (27) in which the desired
base is negatively related to the inflation rate.
Models D and F outperform model A by three criteria——goodness of
fit in every sample period, post—1972 dynamic simulation performance,
and the significance of a post—1972 structural shift as measured by a
Chow test. However, neither model D nor F is satisfactory as a model of
the short—run demand for money. In the 1956—83 equation for model D
(Table 3, column 4) no variable is significant except for the lagged
dependent variable and the credit control dummies. The error—correction
model F has no significant coefficients except for the inflation rate,
the supply shock proxy, and the credit control dummies. It is hard to
avoid reaching the conclusion that these long—period equations represent
a rather futile attempt to fit a single reduced—form equation for real
balances to a period when the underlying real balance equation was
"changing its stripes" from something like a partial adjustment model
for money demand (best described for 1956—72 by model D) to something
like a money reaction function of the central bank. The fact that the
coefficients on output in columns (4) and (6) are essentially zero seems
consistent with the notion that the true underlying coefficient shifted
from positive to negative in the wake of the conjectured change in
control regimes.
The 1981—83 "Velocity Puzzle"
Throughout most of the empirical section of this paper the primary
emphasis has been on an examination of the stability of alternative45
models across the 1973 dividing line that marks the beginning of the
"Goldfeld puzzle" period. An equally interesting period occurred more
recently, between late 1981 and late 1983. During this interval there
was a sharp decline in the velocity of both Ml and M2 relative to their
pre—1981 trends, and a corresponding increase in the quantity of real
balances relative to the predictions of most money demand equations.
Flow do the six empirical models fare in explaining the change inreal
balancesover thIs interval?
The comparison in Table 4focusseson two quarters. The first of
these,1981:04, is the quarter in which most of the dynamic simulations
reach their largest negative value (i.e., actual minus predicted). From
then until the end of the sample period in 1983:03, the simulation
errors uniformly shift in a positive direction. Dynamic simulation
errors are shown for those two quarters in Table 4 for each of the six
models. The top half of the table reports simulation errors for
equations estimated through 1972, and the bottom half reports errors for
equations estimated through 1979. The first three columns refer to
results for the conventional measure of Ml.
Although the size of the errors differs across the models, with the
smallest absolute value of errors achieved for model D in the top half
of Table 4 and for model B in the hotton half, the conclusions regarding
the 1981:04 through 1983:03 interval are identical. Both simulations of
each of the six models exhibit a marked movement of the error in a
positive direction, i.e., the actual level of real Ml balances increased
relative to the prediction, in most cases by between 5 and 8 percent.
This shift is only slightly less than the 10 percent shortfall of
velocity in this period relative to its trend from 1970 to 1980.45A
TABLE 4
Prediction Errors in Dynamic Simulations





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample 1956—72
A —18.2 —10.6 7.6 —20.7 —16.7 4.0
B —16.7 —11.2 5.5 —19.2 —17.4 1.8
C —15.6 —9.6 6.0 —18.2 —16.1 2.1
D —2.8 5.2 8.0 —7.0 —2.9 4.1
E —11.2 —4.3 6.9 —12.0 —8.7 3.3
F —17.5 —10.8 6.7 —17.0 —13.6 3.4
Sample 1956—79
A —2.6 5.6 8.2 —7.8 —3.6 4.2
B —2.5 1.3 3.8 —7.5 —6.7 0.8
C —0.5 5.1 5.6 —5.3 —3.2 2,1
D 3.3 11.8 8.5 —1.5 2.9 4.4
E —0.3 5.9 6.2 —2.4 0.6 3.0
F 0.2 6.0 5.8 —1.0 2.5 3.546
How much of this simulation error can be attributed to financial
innovations which have shifted the composition within Ml of different
types of deposits? While a full examination of alternative monetary
measures is beyond the scope of this paper, results for one alternative
measure are displayed in the right—hand half of Table 4. This is the Ml
transactions measure recently introduced by Spindt (1984), constructed
by a method that weights different components of Ml by their estimated
frequency of turnover. Because this measure places less weight than
conventional Ml on some of the newer components of Ml (e.g., NOW and ATS
accounts), it increases less in 1982 and 1983 than the official measure
of Ml. Corresponding to this is the uniformly smaller 1981—83 shift in
the simulation errors, shown in the far right—hand colunn of Table 4.
The errors are roughly half those calculated with the conventional Ml
measure, suggesting that a substantial part of the 1981—83 velocity
puzzle is attributable to the consequences of financial deregulation
that increased the fraction of Ml consisting of new types of deposits
19
with a relatively low transactions turnover.
VII. CONCLUSION
Relation of Empirical Results to Preceding Analysis
The analytical portion of this paper in sections Il—TV suggested
that the conventional approach to the study of the short—run demand for
The Spindt transactions Ml concept (MQ)isavailable since l970:Q1
as an index number based in that quarter. Our results for the
conventional Ml have been duplicated using the alternative concept by
linking it to conventional Ml in the transition quarter. These results
are not presented in the earlier tables, because they exhibit few
differences that shed light on the main issues.47
money is plagued by severe problems of misspecification and
identification. Several problems were suggested through the analysis of
models of individual and aggregate behavior. The first of these led to
the implication that the usual restriction in money demand equations
that includes only the current value of an explanatory variable, and no
lagged values, is unjustified. A model of individual behavior based on
the permanent income hypothesis of money demand yielded a specification
In which numerous lags of income enter, as well as at least one lag on
the Interest rate. This model is supported in our empirical work by the
results for models C, D, E, and F, in which several lagged values of
explanatory output and interest rate variables enter significantly.
The next suggestion was that the standard money demand equation
might be misspecifiecl if there were gradual adjustment for nominal
balances combined at the aggregate level with gradual adjustment of the
price level. That analysis led to an equation for real money balances
that adds a "supply—shock" variable (zt) to the specification. For
practical estimation my proxy for this variable is the contribution of
various supply shock terms (changes in the relative price of food and
energy, changes in the effective exchange rate, the deviation of
productivity growth from trend, and effects of Nixon price controls) in
the reduced—form equation that I previously developed for the analysis
of U. S. postwar inflation. The proxy variable consists of the actual
values of the supply—shock variables multiplied by their estimated
coefficients in the inflation equation. This supply shock proxy is
statistically significant when added to several of the models,
especially when the sample period is extended to include the 1973—83
period.48
The final suggestion In the analytical section was that a shift in
control regimes by the central bank may shift coefficients in the
reduced form relation explaining real or nominal balances without
indicating any shift in the underlying parameters of the structural
money demand equation. The consistent tendency in our results for the
coefficient on output to decline in the 1956—83 period as compared to
1956—72 suggests that there may be something to this "regime shift"
interpretation of parameter instability. The result that in several
models the coefficient on inflation becomes more significantly negative
In the 1956—83 period is also consistent with the view that the equation
for real balances mixes together demand and supply parameters.
Verdict on the Alternative Models of Dynamic Adjustment
This paper provides a preliminary set of evidence on the
consequences of varying the dynamic specification of the "money demand'
relation from the standard partial adjustment approach that is almost
always employed. The results indicate a tendency for the large
"Goldfeld puzzle" errors that emerge after 1972 with the standard
specification to decline sharply in size when the supply shock proxy is
added, and when each explanatory variable is allowed to enter with four
lagged as well as the current value. The verdict on the error
correction approach is thus far mixed. Model D (partial adjustment with
lags) fits better for 1956—72 than rodel F (error correction), hut the
reverse is true for 1956—83. Whereas model D has much smaller errors
than model F in the post—1972 dynamic simulation, model F performs
better in Chow tests and indicates less evidence of a post—1972
structural shift. Both models D and F when estimated for the longer49
1956—83 period exhibit numerous insignificant coefficients that can he
interpreted as representing a mixture of demand and supply responses.
The most important conclusion of the paper is not to contribute
"one best equation" which is alleged to be stable over some suhperiod of
past historical data, but rather to contribute a new interpretation of
why such equations are so often unstable. Coefficients in equations for
real balances shift in response to changes in monetary control regimes,
and the changes in coefficients in our alternative models can he
interpreted plausibly as reflecting a shift by the Federal Reserve from
greater emphasis on stabilizing interest rates to stabilizing monetary
aggregates. This interpretation of the estimated equations as
"interesting reduced forms," rather than structural money demand
equations, eliminates the need to rationalize peculiar coefficients,
e.g., the zero coefficient on output in models D and F for 1956—83, or
the large negative coefficient on prices and the supply shock term in
model F. These results are all consistent with the hypothesis that the
Federal Reserve during at least part of our sample period tended to
reduce Ml in response to "good news" on output and "bad news" on
inflation.50
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